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Introduction  
 
Born in the wake of devastating famine and the pledge of sustenance that nationalists 
advanced in the dying decades of British rule, the Republic of India had everything to 
gain from the new Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations and its 
internationalist vision of shared uplift. The new nation’s arrival on the world stage 
came sutured to promises of plenty that would set independent India’s government 
apart from its colonial predecessor, whose rule had been pockmarked by hunger and 
characterized by a distorted agricultural economy oriented towards world markets 
rather than basic subsistence. Even before the Bengal Famine of 1943, which claimed 3.5 
million lives and accelerated the push for self-rule, India’s nationalist leadership had 
tied their legitimacy to the provision of food and the stewardship of agricultural 
advance: one well-respected Indian planner, Narendranath Gangulee, dedicated his 
1939 primer on Health and Nutrition in India to ‘Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru and other 
leaders of the Indian National Congress, who have undertaken the responsibility of 
shaping a national policy [for] my Country, where ‘for every three mouths, there are 
only two rice bowls.’1  
 
These visions of agricultural progress would have girded neatly onto the hopes of 
progress that the FAO embodied in its earliest years, exemplified in its unprecedented 
promise of ‘ensuring that all the world’s people had enough to eat.2 Indeed, the preface 
to Gangulee’s text had been written by John Boyd-Orr, the pioneering nutritionist and 
internationalist who would serve as the FAO’s first Director-General.3 And India’s 
earliest years were inexorably tied to the new international institutions: the United 
Nations arbitrated the nation’s first disputes with the state of Pakistan.4 It was also to 
India that the World Bank offered its first, hesitant loans.5 And as actors within the 
World Health Organization pushed it towards the conflicting goals of social medicine 
                                                        
1. Nagendranath Gangulee, Health and Nutrition in India (London: Faber and Faber, 1939). 
2. Amy L.S. Staples, The Birth of Development: How the World Bank, Food and Agriculture 
Organization, and World Health Organization Changed the World, 1945-1965 (Kent, Ohio: Kent State 
Univ. Press, 2007), 82; on hunger and Indian nationalism see Sunil S. Amrith, “Food and Welfare in 
India, C. 1900–1950,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 50 (2008): 1010–1035; and Benjamin 
Siegel, Hungry Nation: Food, Famine, and the Making of Modern India (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2018). 
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and the ‘magic bullet’ approach represented by DDT and antibiotics, India was a critical 
and influential international laboratory.6  
 
Yet in the nation’s two hungriest decades, from independence to the Green Revolution, 
the FAO proved a greater boon to Indian careerism and the authority of Indian experts 
themselves than to the amelioration of Indian hunger. Talented Indian scientists and 
administrators found ready work with the new organization, culminating in the 
unexpected election of the Indian national B.R. Sen as Director-General in 1956. But the 
most substantive Indian efforts to ameliorate hunger transpired beyond the aegis of the 
Organization. Ultimately, it would be a different set of international networks — the 
Ford and Rockefeller Foundation, abetted by pressure from the United States — that 
helped midwife quantitative abundance.7  
 
Rather, Indian experience with the FAO reflected both the winnowing scale of the 
Organization’s ambition, and divergent international and nationalist notions of what 
the Organization was meant to accomplish. From the early and lofty goal of a World 
Food Board, the Organization pivoted to a program of technical assistance to farmers 
and the production and compilation of agricultural statistics, kept in check by the 
budgetary restraint of key donor nations. B.R. Sen’s Freedom From Hunger Campaign 
sought to overcome this stagnation by drawing in non-government assistance, and 
attempting to reanimate the moral mission of the Organization through the Freedom 
From Hunger Campaign.  
 
Ultimately, however, the tensions within the Food and Agriculture Organization kept it 
from actualizing its loftiest ends. Even the most capable administrators were unable to 
reconcile the conflicting goals of increased agricultural productivity and market 
availability, on the one hand, and the assumption of food as a shared global moral 
responsibility, on the other.8 Donor states, in turn, drew upon the international moral 
authority embedded in international institutions in the middle of the century, and used 
the Organization as an instrument to cajole, punish, and persuade, lessening its 
attractiveness to the world’s hungriest nations, and its viability as an instrument of 
shared uplift.9  
                                                        
6. Sunil Amrith, Decolonizing International Health: India and Southeast Asia, 1930-65 (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2006). 
7. Leonard A. Gordon, “Wealth Equals Wisdom? The Rockefeller and Ford Foundations in India,” Annals 
of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 554 (November 1, 1997): 104–116; Nick 
Cullather, The Hungry World: America’s Cold War Battle Against Poverty in Asia (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 2010). 
8. Lucy Jarosz, “The Political Economy of Global Governance and the World Food Crisis: The Case of 
the FAO,” Review (Fernand Braudel Center) 32, no. 1 (January 1, 2009): 37–60. 
9. Staples, The Birth of Development. On moral authority and technical expertise, and friction between 
international organizations and member states, see Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore, Rules for the 
World: International Organizations in Global Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003). 
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These foundering hopes owed much to the larger disconnect between bureaucrats 
staffing international organizations and Indian representatives on the world stage. If the 
former saw in India the possibility of dollar funds to underwrite costly developmental 
schemes, the latter proffered technical expertise and assistance to a country that already 
had its own rich network of agricultural research institutions. Indian officials hoped in 
large measure that the Organization would be to Indian agriculture as the World Bank 
was to international finance – “our international banker,” in the words of B.K. Nehru, 
charged for funding but not shaping Indian policy.10 
 
The Indian experience and its failures offer unique insight into the interplay of 
international expertise and the imperatives of postcolonial development planning. If 
wedded to the promise of plenty, so too were Indian nationalists married to notions of 
autarkic self-sufficiency on the food front.11 Programs of agricultural uplift in 
postcolonial India did draw liberally upon international idioms and networks of 
colonial and Cold War origin.12 Yet for many years after independence, expertise in 
Indian agriculture and food planning — as research other domains — was of an 
increasingly protectionist character.13 And India’s large landowners – obligate 
participants in any major scheme of agricultural development – made use of the 
Republic of India’s federalist system to stymie the project of land reform tha FAO 
experts’ vision of agricultural advancement would require.14 
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Accordingly, Indian politicians, scientists, and planners looked to the Food and 
Agriculture as a repository of international authority — a resource for making policy 
arguments or an institution for advancing their own careers — yet its enduring impact 
upon India’s nutritional well-being remained insubstantial. 
 
Wallace Aykroyd and the Transfer of Indian Expertise  
 
The internationalist aspiration reflected in the formation of the FAO, and the tension 
between national planning and international expertise, was evident in the career of the 
celebrated colonial nutritionist Wallace Aykroyd in the final year of imperial rule. 
Aykroyd’s professional life had been international in character from the start.15 He had 
begun his career as a hospitalist in Dublin before a chance posting in Newfoundland, 
where poor fishermen’s pervasive beriberi had initiated the young doctor into the 
burgeoning field of nutrition. After four years in Canada, Aykroyd returned to Europe 
in 1931, appointed the first nutritionist for the League of Nations’ Health Secretariat in 
Geneva. But after four years of committee work and report drafting, the sociable 
Aykroyd had been recruited to India by the new viceroy, Lord Linlithgow, asked to 
take over the Nutrition Research Laboratories from its founder, Robert McCarrison.  
 
High in the cool Nilgiri Hills, surrounded by verdant tea fields, McCarrison had built 
the Laboratories into an institute of international renown. The Irish doctor had served 
across the subcontinent as a member of the Indian Medical Service, and with the 
prejudices of the time, had been taken by ‘the fine physique, powers of endurance and 
relative freedom from disease of the peoples’ of northwest India.16 In the Himalayan 
town of Kasauli, McCarrison began research on diet and goiter, before transition to a 
project on beriberi with a Sikh colleague in 1918. In 1925, McCarrison was given a 
former jam processing facility in the Pasteur Institute in Coonoor for his continuing 
work on ‘deficiency diseases,’ which he stocked with rats and monkeys fed on diets 
designed to mimic those of India’s different populations.  
 
McCarrison had worked diligently, and his primer on diet became the standard text in 
public institutions across India.17 Yet he had the reputation of a bench scientist uneasy 
in the world of public outreach, and it was with the idea of nutritional consciousness in 
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mind that Aykroyd had been appointed his successor. Aykroyd had worked 
assiduously, recruiting Indian staff, collecting equipment, and devising new means of 
assessing the state of India’s nutritional well-being and communicating that 
information to a public outside of the laboratory. By 1939, Aykroyd had begun 
publishing the results of a massively ambitious survey of India’s rural and urban diets, 
chronicling their generally lamentable state with tabular precision.18 Beyond his general 
conclusions — that Indian agriculture would need to be re-arranged to provide for 
greater pulses, vegetables, and other nutritive foods — Aykroyd worked to 
communicate the Laboratories’ findings to policymakers and the public. His brochures 
on nutrition were translated into multiple Indian languages, and sixty nutrition officers 
had been hired to survey and consult in Bengal, Bihar, Punjab, Baroda and Hyderabad. 
Meanwhile, his Nutrition Advisory Committee began regular consultative meetings in 
Delhi, and building upon his connections in Geneva, Aykroyd forged links and 
collaborations with the League of Nations’ Technical Commission on Nutrition. By 
1940, Aykroyd had established a sterling reputation among Indians and Britons alike, 
but still lamented that, ‘as yet, the mass of [India’s] population has scarcely been 
reached.’19  
 
By the dying days of empire, however, Aykroyd seemed to be wondering if nutrition 
were a domain best-suited to nations, or whether it was the promise of international 
cooperation and collective advance that held the solution. In 1943, Aykroyd was 
deputed to Hot Springs, Virginia, as one of India’s delegates to the United Nations 
Conference on Food and Agriculture, where he took the lead in drafting the report that 
would lead to the founding of the Food and Agriculture Organization. And a year later, 
as a member of the Commission of Inquiry into the Bengal Famine, Aykroyd cast doubt, 
contra Indian nationalists, that freedom alone would herald improved nutritional 
outcomes. No matter its composition, Aykroyd felt, a government would need to move 
past laissez-faire notions of the food economy and assume new responsibility for 
changes in diet and agriculture alike.20 And so at the beginning of 1946, with India’s 
independence all but certain, Aykroyd turned over the cache of equipment and samples 
that he had amassed at the Laboratories to the Indian biochemist V.N. Patwardhan, 
having been recruited by Lord John Boyd-Orr as head of the Nutrition Division at the 
new Food and Agriculture Organization. The move had not been an unexpected one, 
given Aykroyd’s increasing presence at international gatherings throughout the 
wartime years, yet its impact was no less monumental on the staff he had left behind.  
 
Throughout the summer, Aykroyd kept close tabs on his colleagues at the Laboratories, 
and in India’s Department of Food, corresponding frequently with W.H. Kirby, the 
Department of Food Official who had overseen India’s wartime rationing schemes. 
                                                        
18. W.R. Aykroyd, Note on the Results of Diet Surveys in India (New Delhi, 1939). 
19. “Note on the Work of the Nutrition Research Laboratories, Coonoor.” 
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Kirby lamented India’s worsening food troubles — ‘you’ll hear too much about them 
soon!’ he promised in a February letter — but continued to plan for a film project on 
India’s nutritional needs.21 Yet the letters from his Indian colleagues were of a different 
nature: Aykroyd found himself deluged with requests for recommendation letters, 
inundated by old assistants and subordinates’ appeals for work with the new 
international organization. The medical researcher O.P. Verma lamented the sudden 
shift away from field project, and asked, if barring a new assignment to India’s public 
health commission, Aykroyd would recommend him for ‘one of the FAO jobs.’22 The 
physician M.M. Shafi wrote to Aykroyd to lament the lack of ‘practical work’ available 
in the Food Department. ‘I find that in U.N.O.,’ Shaffi wrote from the Department of 
Food, ‘they are in need of officers. If you think my experience of the West and the East 
can help in the nutrition work, I shall appreciate if you could let me have a letter of 
recommendation.’23 So, too, did the researcher Kanwar Lal Shourie write asking for 
help in securing an assignment with the FAO’s Nutrition Division.24 And P.M. Kaul, a 
high-ranking officer in the Indian Medical Service soon to be deputed to the World 
Health Organization, asked if Aykroyd could use his bully pulpit with the FAO to find 
overseas training in the United States for a number of budding nutrition experts — 
most notably, M.S. Swaminathan, whose work would help usher in the Green 
Revolution several decades later.25  
 
Aykroyd fielded these requests gracefully, obliging some and gently declining others. 
But the clear takeaway was that India’s nutritional network, built assiduously over the 
course of several decades, was buckling under the weight of decolonization, and the 
emergence of a new, international organization with global authority behind it. Kirby 
noticed the same in a November 1946 visit to Coonoor. ‘I think your old love has been 
slowly going downhill since you left it,’ he reported.26 Yet several paragraphs later, 
Kirby followed up with a plaintive request. ‘Do you think I could be of any use in the 
[FAO’s] proposed World Food Board,’ he asked, ‘and if so, ‘could you kindly let me 
                                                        
21. W.H. Kirby, “Letter to W.R. Aykroyd,” February 12, 1946, RG 57.1 Series B3 - W.R. Aykroyd 
Incoming Letters from Governments, FAO Archives, Rome; W.R. Aykroyd, “Letter to G.V. Allen,” 
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Aykroyd Outgoing Letters to Governments 1946-1949, FAO Archives, Rome. 
22. O.P. Verma, “Letter to W.R. Aykroyd,” June 14, 1946, RG 57.1 Series B3 - W.R. Aykroyd Incoming 
Letters from Governments, FAO Archives, Rome. 
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know the correct channels through which I should apply?’27  
 
The scramble that followed in the wake of Aykroyd’s departure for the FAO spoke to 
both the charisma of a pioneering scientist and the exigencies wrought by the end of 
British rule in India, as colonial experts sought to deploy their knowledge in the service 
of more politically viable projects. Yet the crush of Indian scientists who sought 
employment under the celebrated nutritionist testifies to the promise that the new 
organization represented to Indians and others in an era of turmoil and uncertainty. 
With the imperial project reaching an ignoble and protracted end in the wake of the 
Second World War, the world’s new, postcolonial nations were now faced with 
addressing the deficiencies of land, health, and food that had so often animated 
nationalist struggles. New institutions like the FAO and the World Health Organization 
carried the promise of shared advance predicated upon the collective marshaling of 
scientific, economic, and technological expertise. If there was something vaguely 
desperate in the letters that flooded W.H. Aykroyd’s mailbox in the last year of imperial 
rule — the resumé-polishing that invariably occurs in the wake of new management — 
so, too, was there a note of optimism. The FAO would be, in these petitioners’ 
imagination, the site for exciting new ‘practical work’ in nutrition, the font of funds for 
new training and technologies, and in time, a shared repository of expertise that would 
help new nations shed vestigial illness and want. The scientists and bureaucrats who 
sought to follow Aykroyd to Rome, or Washington indeed brought their talents to new 
shores — but the promise of plenty that the FAO represented would be soon diluted by 
the quixotic failures of internationalism and the defensive idioms of postcolonial 
nationalism.  
 
Late Colonial Internationalism: Indian Bureaucrats and Founding of the FAO  
 
Aykroyd and the other colonial administrators who arrived in Hot Springs, Virginia, in 
1943 for the United Nations Conference on Food and Agriculture were undertaking a 
perilous balancing act. From offices in Delhi and Calcutta, bureaucrats at every level 
were denying the famine mounting in Bengal, while India’s colonial emissaries were 
admitting, in the United States, that India’s nutritional prospects were dire.28 The 
conference had been convened, John Boyd-Orr would later recall, to ‘consider ways and 
means of international co-operation to raise standards of nutrition throughout the 
world, and at the same time to raise the standard of living of the two-thirds of the 
population of the world depending for their living on agriculture, the majority of whom 
were in abysmal poverty.’29 Yet the Indians closest to this abysmal poverty bristled at 
                                                        
27. Ibid. 
28. On the famine, see Janam Mukherjee, Hungry Bengal: War, Famine and the End of Empire (New 
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the foreign emissaries who had been chosen to represent them.  
 
In the days and weeks following the conference, as famine spread throughout India, the 
Indian nationalist press initially buzzed with rumors that there were to be new 
international agreements over prices and provisioning. Anxious bureaucrats in India’s 
External Affairs department cabled their counterparts in Washington to ensure that this 
was not, in fact, an agreement stemming from the conference.30 In publicity brochures 
circulated by the Food Department in New Delhi, colonial emissaries trumpeted the 
commitment to freedom from hunger that they had vowed to the world in Virginia.31 
Yet Indian nationalists were incredulous. The Modern Review lambasted the paltry 
number of Indians who had been sent to Hot Springs alongside the airy and 
noncommittal nature of the conference’s conclusions. ‘The starving masses of India,’ 
one editorial seethed, ‘should be grateful to learn that her rice needs were recognized at 
the Conference, although nothing could be done.’ India, it continued, ‘is probably the 
only country in the world which can silently tolerate scheming for the alleviation of 
famine in war-torn countries — more accurately, those in Europe — by persons 
claiming to represent her, while her own people, men, women and children are 
starving.’32  
 
Nationalist critique spilled off the pages of the Modern Review. Bombay’s socialist 
mayor, M.R. Masani, would lambast the British administrators who denied famine for 
so long at home, but readily admitted at the conference that ‘one-third of the Indian 
people are habitually under-fed in normal times.’33 And the nationalist writer J.M. Deb 
remarked that one ‘need only quote what was said by the representatives of the British 
Government in India at the Hot Springs Conference in the United States of America 
about the food situation in India to expose the hollowness’ of the imperial 
administration’s commitment to feeding the Indian masses, having admitted abroad 
that ‘a third of the Indian people were habitually underfed even in normal times.’34 This 
percentage, proffered without supporting evidence, was adopted as gospel by Indian 
planners, even as better data became available. The Gujarati nationalist and future Food 
Minister K.M. Munshi would use the Hot Springs number in his manifesto, The Ruin 
that Britain Wrought, published three years later, and the economist and planner 
Radhakamal Mukerjee would use it to bolster his own contemporary plans for national 
reconstruction.35  
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When India’s Central Legislative Assembly was asked to consider a motion supporting 
the constitution of the newly-proposed Food and Agriculture Organization, the debate 
turned rancorous.36 A bloc of parliamentarians suggested that India’s colonial 
representatives offered scant legitimacy: one MLA, Abdul Qaiyum, suggested that the 
FAO ‘should consider the [moral] credentials of a Government like that of India, which 
had allowed chronic malnutrition, famine, and destitution, illiteracy, and absence of 
medical relief to prevail in the country, while the officers of the Government were busy 
issuing ordinances laying down how much the tailoring charge of coats and trousers 
should be.’ A larger faction — which successfully introduced an amendment to the 
motion — worried that an international body could pave the way for quicker 
exploitation of India’s agricultural resources. The legislator and peasant leader N.G. 
Ranga urged that the FAO consider not only the interest of consumers, but India’s 
agricultural producers, as well, as they worked for remunerative prices on the market.  
 
Yet even at this early date, as nationalists debated the meanings of international 
cooperation in a colonial context, Indian delegates began angling for places for 
themselves in an emerging institutional framework. Nationalist ferment, and the 
deepening postwar expectation of British departure, led to the increased participation of 
Indian bureaucrats and scientists in the incipient organization. Two years after Hot 
Springs, it was a chiefly Indian delegation which arrived for a preparatory meeting in 
Kansas City. W.R. Aykroyd was the chief delegate, but he was accompanied by India’s 
Agricultural Commissioner, D.R. Sethi, and Dr. Beni Prasad, an Indian fisheries expert. 
The delegation lobbied for funding for training for Indian students to study advanced 
farming techniques abroad, and for new opportunities for Indians to study holistic land 
use programs like the Tennessee Valley Authority.37 Gove Hambidge, executive 
secretary of the United Nations Commission on Food and Agriculture, seemed eager to 
secure Indian buy-in, outlining in a radio broadcast the possibility of the new 
organization encouraging the manufacture and distribution of modern farm 
instruments in India as a key battleground in the global fight against hunger.38  
 
A year later, representatives were convening in Quebec for the founding conferences of 
the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. The Indian delegation, 
headed by Agent-General G.S. Bajpai, was a mix of veteran civil servants and rising 
bureaucrats. Aykroyd was once again among their ranks, but with independence on the 
horizon, the delegation was primarily Indian: a Punjab parliamentarian was in 
attendance, as well as a senior Forestry Department member, alongside the 
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distinguished Delhi University economist V.K.R.V. Rao and the agricultural expert M.S. 
Randhawa.39 Bajpai’s address before the conference demonstrated a delicate 
ambivalence that foreshadowed a complex relationship of hope and nationalist pride. 
The challenges to India’s nutritional well-being, he averred, could not be overstated, 
particularly in light of the petitioning that other representatives were making for food 
imports. A third of India’s four million citizens, he suggested, repeating that familiar 
statistics, did not get enough to eat, and that with an average per capita income of about 
$22 dollars, Indians’ purchasing power remained too low to acquire food on the 
international market. The new FAO, Bajpai continued, would not ‘accomplish miracles,’ 
and would have to recognize national self-help as the prerequisite for adequate 
foodstuffs. India’s government, he contended, was newly ‘resolved to assume 
responsibility for the adequate nourishment of the people and to take the measures 
necessary to achieve the end.’ It was the new nation itself, he proclaimed, that would 
diligently tackle the food problem, and succeed.  
 
Yet Bajpai and his peers saw a role for the FAO in ensuring that India had the right 
tools — physical and economic — for the job. The new organization could be useful in 
‘the procurement of agricultural machinery and of facilities for specialized training for 
her nationals in various branches of agriculture.’ It would prove its worth through the 
collection of good statistical data. And with an attention to the imperatives of price 
incentives that would characterize the Organization’s first, failed efforts, he noted that 
the FAO might best be useful in ensuring to farmers ‘fair and equitable prices for the 
harvest of their toil.’ Indian experts, he contended, must be central in the Organization’s 
operations. While India possessed, ‘east of Suez, perhaps the best agricultural institute 
of research in the world,’ its technical workers needed the opportunity to train and 
serve abroad, and should be represented fairly among the FAO’s higher ranks.  
 
The Indian team which returned from Denmark a year later would make similar claims 
for India’s importance in this global forum. The veteran civil servant P. Srivastava 
returned to India from Denmark touting India’s gains there.40 ‘The size of India,’ he 
declared, ‘its importance both as a producer and a consumer country, its bitter and 
continuing experience of food shortage and famine and its success in food 
administration on a scale unattempted by any other country entitled her delegates to be 
heard with attention and respect, and in the conference her due place among the great 
nations has been given full recognition.’ Srivastava lauded India’s success in making a 
case for fertilizers and agricultural machinery to be imported to India under favorable 
terms, in ensuring that any international nutritional standards placed India on ‘the 
highest standards,’ and in lobbying for expert training in fisheries and other domains 
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that would help unearth India’s ‘untapped food wealth.’ From its inception, India’s 
representatives at the FAO were negotiating the new nation’s distinct place within it, 
with an admixture of caution and opportunism.  
 
‘A Progressive and Revolutionary Ideal’: Dashed Aspirations in the Boyd-Orr Years  
 
Indian bureaucrats looked expectantly at independence to the lofty inaugural proposal 
advanced by Lord John Boyd-Orr for the Organization and its member states, flush 
with cash and internationalist ambition alike. Beginning in 1945, Boyd-Orr had 
proposed the creation of a World Food Board, an instrument which many Indian 
representatives saw as well-suited to the nation’s hunger.41 Indeed, many Indian 
politicians were hatching plans for national price stabilizing bodies at the same time, 
suggesting that only price interventions could bridge the disparity between India’s low 
purchasing power and the high price of food. These gloomy economic predictions had 
been worsened by the agricultural costs of partition: at independence, India’s most 
arable provinces, Bengal and Pakistan, had been violently divided, and the new 
Republic was home to all of India’s traditional famine regions, with only 69% of its 
former arable land.42  
 
The board that Boyd-Orr proposed would promote agricultural production across the 
world by stabilizing prices at a global level. The proposed Board would purchase and 
hold buffer stocks equal to about six to twelve months of global trade. When global 
prices of foodstuffs were high, the Board would release stocks onto the market; when 
prices were low, they would, conversely, purchase them. This purchasing scheme 
would protect farmers and consumers, and the Board would simultaneously extend 
long-term credit for agricultural development, with repayment tied to developing 
nations’ economic growth. Such a proposal, Boyd-Orr envisioned, would increase 
farmers’ purchasing power, which in turn would stimulate the production of capital 
goods. At a moment when India’s first nationalist leaders were eager to actualize 
agricultural development with a minimum of capital input, Boyd-Orr’s proposal was a 
deeply attractive one to Indian planners. Ultimately, in 1966, India would create its only 
body, the Food Corporation of India, which would attempt to manage prices and stocks 
in a similar manner.  
 
The plan offered much to Indian administrators, offering a wide degree of national 
autonomy which advancing the promise of stabilized markets for Indian 
agriculturalists. V.K.R.V. Rao of Delhi University had trumpeted his support for the 
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Board soon after it was outlined at the 1946 FAO Conference in Copenhagen.43 B.R. Sen 
added his support, announcing that India would be working on their own domestic 
buffer stores of grain, and that Boyd-Orr’s plans meshed well with the ‘accepted policy 
of Government that steps should be taken to stabilize agricultural prices in the future.’44 
Bihar’s finance Minister, A.N. Sinha, deputed to the FAO’s meeting in Geneva in 
September 1947, suggested that international commodity agreements under the aegis of 
the World Food Board would work well alongside India’s own planning schemes.45  
 
Representatives of India’s peasantry lauded the proposal, eager to secure more 
consistently remunerative prices for Indian crops. N.G. Ranga, who had expressed 
cautious optimism for the FAO as a parliamentarian, touted the ‘revolutionary’ 
character of the Board, though his version was far more radical than that which was 
actually being proposed.46 The idea that ‘the richer countries [would] take delivery of 
all the food surpluses in their own countries and in others and to make them available 
to all poorer countries at specially low prices,’ he contended, ‘is indeed a progressive 
and revolutionary ideal when contrasted with the usual capitalist device of dumping 
surplus production of one set of countries in another set of countries merely for the sake 
of markets but to the destruction of the merchants and producers of importing 
countries.’ The FAO, Ranga felt, would ‘cure the world of this capitalist disease,’ and 
‘once this solution is adopted, ‘peasants need not be afraid of their bumper harvest ever 
resulting in a slump for their produce. [...] It is thus a democratic and socialistic ideal for 
the achievement of which world peasants are now being prepared by the FAO.’  
 
Boyd-Orr’s proposal was ambitious indeed, though nowhere nearly as radical as Ranga 
wished to believe. Yet the proposal did court the fervent disapproval of India’s 
merchants. The Secretary of the conservative Indian Merchants’ Chamber appealed in a 
January 1947 memorandum to the Department of Food to include private industry in 
any agreement made under the proposed World Food Board.47 ‘Every opportunity,’ the 
Secretary wrote, should ‘be taken by Government for emphasizing and preserving the 
principle of utilizing the normal channels of trade in all the stages of the work 
connected with the enforcement and administration of the said decisions.’ Indian rice 
merchants in particular, he contended, should be able to ‘place their machinery and 
personnel at the service of government for performing the functions resulting from the 
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obligations undertaken by the Government of India in consequence of the setting up of 
the World Food Board.’ A Food Board which deprived trade of its rightful place in the 
sale of foodgrains was one that no merchant in India could stomach.  
 
And if India’s merchants shuddered at the thought of Boyd-Orr’s board, they were 
joined by administrators and politicians in the United States and the United Kingdom, 
who found the proposal alternately laughable and odious. As British Foreign Office 
staff mocked Boyd-Orr’s seeming irreverence for financial details in his ‘plan for an 
agricultural Paradise,’ American administrators worried about the plan to create three 
new international organizations to manage credit, buffer stocks, and famine 
distribution, loathe to cede authority to international bodies and the opportunity to use 
food aid to persuade and cajole.48 The FAO, as Frank Trentmann has noted, ‘turned out 
to be a more conservative body than many internationalists had hoped, focusing on 
improved living conditions rather than on eliminating world hunger.’49 The Eastern 
Economist was lamenting the failure of Boyd-Orr’s plan as early as 1946, declaring that 
‘proposals for a World Food Board and a world food plan have been totally 
abandoned,’ and laying the blame squarely on the United States, which was ‘sabotaging 
the international character of the FAO.’ Without the support of the United States, the 
FAO’s mission would be ‘left at the mercy of the naive American belief in the magic of 
the expanding world economy.’50  
 
Within a year of its formal founding, it was growing clear to Indian observers that the 
FAO was not the egalitarian body that its nationalists would have hoped for, and the 
sense of thwarted possibility grew with each dashed plan. India’s representatives 
appealed to the FAO for food gifts in the desperately lean months of late 1947, finding 
themselves frustrated that such moves were beyond the Organization’s mandate.51 It 
refused to participate in the World Agricultural Census planned by the FAO in the 
closing years of the decade, citing manpower constraints.52 V.R.K.V. Rao, an early 
proponent of the promise that the Organization held out to India’s hungry, admitted in 
a series of articles in the Eastern Economist that ‘not much by way of concrete action has 
been undertaken so far.’53 Other Indian voices lamented the FAO’s disproportionate 
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focus on hunger in the West. In 1949, the Indian government statistician W.R. Natu 
urged the FAO to place ‘a high priority to the claims of Asia and the Far East,’ home to 
the ‘real have-nots in the world.’54  
 
If many Indians had responded warmly to the World Food Board proposal, their ardor 
was cooled in 1949 when the FAO fielded a plan for an International Clearing House, a 
new body tasked with buying agricultural surpluses and selling them to food-short 
countries.55 The proposal’s focus on currency buy-ins would, many Indian observers 
suggested, unfairly hamper India and other countries with low purchasing power. ‘It is 
not necessary,’ the Eastern Economist opined ‘to pick holes in the FAO proposal for an 
International Commodity Clearing House, simply because it is as full of holes as any 
ordinary household sieve.’56 In a later, damning assessment, the journal lamented the 
diminishing vision of the FAO. That vision ‘began with Lord Boyd Orr’s grand vision of 
a World Food Board, which would feed the earth’s hungry millions by making two 
blades grow in the deserts and swamps, where none grows now. It was so impressive 
as a vision that the member nations of the FAO simply could not take it as anything 
else; and as a vision it still remains, with the visionary being appropriately rewarded 
with a Nobel Peace Prize — appropriately because, peace, like freedom from hunger, 
appears to be just another vision, or perhaps, illusion!’ The ICCH scheme had fallen 
through, the journal noted, ‘and with it all attempts at global food planning appear to 
have been abandoned — at least for the time being.’57 Indian opprobrium reached its 
peak in July 1949, when its representative joined the USSR in lambasting the FAO’s 
inability to increase food production globally, suggesting conspiratorially that it had 
concerned itself chiefly with the maintenance of high market prices.58  
 
In the absence of more favorable and viable plans in Rome and Washington, Indian 
representatives began to lobby for greater Indian representation and influence within 
the organization. In 1947, government representatives urged that the FAO quicken its 
hiring of Indian experts in agriculture and animal husbandry. Two years later, W.R. 
Natu was urging that Indians needed to be more included more prominently in the 
organization’s administration, since only they and other Asians could ‘interpret the 
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desires and aspirations of Asian Peasants.’59 The Economic Weekly, writing about the 
failure of the commodity clearing house in 1949, noted the silver lining that was five 
Indian experts who had been deputed to the United States as expert consultants.60 These 
schemes were abetted by W.R. Aykroyd who, from from his offices in Rome and 
Washington, continued to look after colleagues and friends in India, helping to secure 
positions for Indians overseas. Aykroyd worked to secure the participation of old 
colleagues from Coonoor in the Congress of Tropical Medicine, and brought 
international nutrition experts traveling under the FAO’s auspices to the Indian 
institutions he had helped midwife.61  
 
This lobbying for Indian influence became clear in the interlinked conferences and 
meetings that took place in the closing years of decade. In May and June 1947, an 
International Rice Study Group comprising delegates from Australia, Burma, China, 
France, India, Netherlands, the Philippines, Siam, the United Kingdom, the United 
States, and the United Nations was held in Travancore state.62 Chaired by agricultural 
economist S.Y. Krishnaswami, the Group studied the production, storage, distribution 
and international trade of rice, recommending the formation of a Central Rice Board for 
South and Southeast Asia for the appropriate distribution of surpluses. Food Minister 
Rajendra Prasad, inaugurating the meeting, hoped that the group’s efforts would ‘help 
in the improvement of India’s food position and enable the country to secure whatever 
it could from other countries, especially those having large surpluses at their disposal.’63 
The real success of the Group, however, was that it had been held in Travancore 
concurrently with another conference in Washington on global plant and animal stocks 
— a coup for India’s participation on the world stage. Shortly thereafter, a similar 
meeting on agricultural cooperatives in Asia was held in Lucknow.64 Uttar Pradesh’s 
governor, H.P. Mody, emphasized in opening the conference that the co-operative idea 
is of particular importance to Asian countries, with their predominantly agricultural 
economy.’65 India’s delegation, headed by Bombay Finance Minister V.L. Mehta, 
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emphasized that India could serve as a model, among the international community, of 
high-functioning cooperative work in agriculture, noting that Indochina and Thailand 
already seemed to be patterning their cooperatives on Indian models.66  
 
Once again, India had found that if the FAO were not the effective and egalitarian body 
it had been made out to be, Indians could at least use it to secure seats at the 
international table — or as an international authority to win policy debates at home.67 
This dynamic became blisteringly clear in 1949, when a major disagreement between 
two camps in the combined Food and Agriculture Ministry broke out over the target 
goals for agricultural production, and the possibility of self-sufficiency in food by 1951. 
‘Though they share one Minister,’ a British observer noted, ‘the ministries are situated 
two miles apart, and their approach to the common problem about as wide apart, too.’68 
Agriculture Ministry officials had pressed for the two-year time frame, reaching out to 
former FAO chief Boyd-Orr to come to India to give his blessing. Food Ministry 
representatives, by contrast, had rallied behind the estimates of the current FAO 
Director, Norris Dodd, that India would more realistically be able to reduce food 
imports to 1.5 million tons annually, reaching self-sufficiency at a later date.  
 
Research and Expertise under the Expanded Program for Technical Assistance  
 
In 1952, British science journalist Richie Calder found himself dispatched to the unlikely 
destination of Cuttack, Orissa. Unexpectedly, the editor of London’s News Chronicle had 
found himself something of a spokesman for the United Nations’ new developmental 
organizations. Three years prior, he had traveled across North Africa and the Middle 
East at the behest of UNESCO, surveying the organization’s efforts to promote 
reclamation and find new productive uses for desert lands. The trip resulted in a 
popular book, Men Against the Desert.69 Soon thereafter, Calder was asked to traverse 
South and Southeast Asia on behalf of the World Health Organization and the Food and 
Agriculture Organization, charged with a similar mission. His report from Cuttack was 
breathless, as her chronicled the efforts being undertaken to feed India’s four hundred 
million new citizens, dependent on ‘bread-grain from North America and even having 
to turn to Egypt and Brazil for rice.’70 There, in bungalows repurposed as laboratories, 
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the Asian scientists staffing the Rice Research Station were deploying scientific grit and 
know-how in the service of Asia’s shared prosperity.  
 
The Rice Research Station was an exemplar of what the Food and Agriculture 
Organization could do in the absence of the lofty goals that had characterized its earlier 
incarnations. India’s eating habits were so fixed, Calder declared, and its agricultural 
methods so set, that it was perhaps best to avoid any effort to remake agricultural 
techniques or Indian diets. ‘Even if the machines and the means were available,’ he 
declared, ‘it would be difficult to wean the rice peasants from the habits of centuries. 
Even though they might recognize the value of new ideas in cultivation, it would take 
time for them to learn new skills and modify tradition.’ Yet the benefits of new strains 
of crops, and of rice in particular, were evident in a single season, and it was with that 
very practical goal of creating new hybrids that the Food and Agriculture Organization 
of the United Nations had lent its support to the Station, bringing in scientists from ten 
Asian nations to work under an Indian director, and securing funding for the Station 
from the UN Technical Assistance Board.  
 
In a period of reduced ambition for the FAO, Indian administrators were able to eke out 
their strongest gains from the fledgling organization as it focused, under the 
directorship of Norris Dodd, on programs of technical assistance. Stymied by American 
recalcitrance, the FAO turned, beginning in 1951, to the provision of technical 
assistance, relying upon funds from the United Nations’ Expanded Program for 
Technical Assistance — funds which quintupled the FAO’s budget in a single year from 
a paltry $750,000 to nearly $5.25 million. Nearly a third of EPTA’s funding, pooled from 
member nations’ voluntary donations, went to the FAO, which sent training missions to 
countries which requested assistance to particular projects.71 India and Indians stood to 
gain much from these projects — though FAO funding was rarely, if ever requested or 
given for projects to increase India’s staple grain production.  
 
From the very beginning, it was clear that the key impediment to India’s nutritional 
well-being — quantitative caloric abundance — would not be undertaken through FAO 
networks. India lobbied for the FAO’s assistance in their fight against the destructive 
and invasive Kans grass, which had vexed peasants for years and represented a 
formidable obstacle to land reclamation.72 In 1950, at India’s request, the FAO deputed 
two expert mechanics to the newly-formed Central Tractor Organization in Uttar 
Pradesh, supervising the maintenance of new machinery and the construction of a 
training and repair workshop in Bareilly with the aim of facilitating land reclamation.73 
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The Organization soon delegated another three experts to the Terai region of the same 
province to oversee land reclamation projects directly, and to assist in the promulgation 
of better hand-made tools. Before long, other experts were ‘imported’ under FAO 
auspices to oversee veterinary training aimed at eradicating rinderpest, to supervise 
irrigation schemes, to work on the production of sawmills and pulpwood production, 
to combat soil erosion via afforestation, and to develop fisheries in West Bengal.74 The 
next year, the FAO deputed nine new experts to the Central Tractor Organization and 
eight experts to a livestock production and animal disease prevention team.75 A dairy 
technician was sent to the a clean milk production scheme in Bombay, and a sheep 
expert to a production facility in the Himalayas. Further veterinarians were sent to 
work on vaccines for rinderpest and other local endemic diseases, while another group 
was sent to oversee a particularly sensitive project: the production of profitable hides 
and skins from milch cows which had passed their usable age. Meanwhile, the FAO 
sponsored a number of investigations into a number of interlinked projects, from a 
survey of Zebu cattle in India to a large-scale investigation into the process of land 
reform.76  
 
By 1954, a Dutch expert from the FAO was working overtime on a Sundarbans fisheries 
project.77 The Bombay dairy scheme had expanded into a new course of study being run 
under FAO auspices.78 And two Iowa State professors had been sent to Delhi to lecture 
at a new FAO training center on applied agricultural experimentation.79 New experts 
had been sent to the machinery workshops in Uttar Pradesh, and more veterinarians to 
the vaccine project being undertaken at Izatnagar.80 Two hundred sheep had been 
imported to a breeding station, and a sheep advisory service was instructing Indians on 
the production of wool. An FAO naval architect had been sent to supervise the 
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motorization of fishing boats, and experts had been sent to supervise timber 
engineering and the steadying of sand dunes in Rajasthan. Prime Minister Nehru had 
taken note of the steady stream of FAO experts, meeting with a food technologist in 
Uttar Pradesh and conveying dismay when an FAO expert mission to investigate jhum 
(swidden) practices in Assam was blocked by the state government.81 By the middle of 
the decade, there were around fifty full-time FAO experts supervising projects across 
the length and breath of the country.82  
 
The FAO contributed greatly, in the EPTA years, to the advancement of individual 
projects. Yet with a focus on export crops and products like sheep, wool, and fisheries, 
as well as the preservation and conservation of ‘supplementary foods’ like fish, eggs, 
and meat, the FAO was cordoned off from the more politically important projects of 
ensuring adequate caloric sustenance. Thorny questions of staple crop production and 
distribution, of land management and the question of public provisioning, were kept 
hermetically sealed from the domain of international expertise, and would remain 
cloistered until at least the Ford Foundation’s pilot program in India, beginning in 
1959.83 In the absence of a more dramatic contribution to India’s continuing agricultural 
maladies, Indian parliamentarians continued to question the need for participation at 
all. In the Rajya Sabha in September 1956, Food Minister A.P. Jain defended India’s 
annual subscription of $200,000 to skeptical parliamentarians, noting that the FAO did 
not give financial assistance as presumed, but ‘technical assistance in the shape of 
foreign experts, fellowships for trainings of Indians abroad, and research purposes,’ 
whose value far exceeded the annual cost of membership.84 It was clear that Indian 
administrators valued the opportunities that the FAO provided to gain plum postings 
abroad; likewise, visiting dignitaries from the Organization were feted with great 
fanfare, particularly when they acknowledged that India’s hunger made it all the most 
central in the organization’s strategic planning.85 
 
But the internationalists who had been so optimistic about the FAO’s aims at the 
Organization’s inception recalled the 1950s as a decade of stagnation. In large measure, 
the stagnating project of land reform – implemented in a formal sense and subverted 
frequently in practice – ensured that landowners had little incentive to participate in the 
larger designs of state planners. India’s ministerial class proved equally stuborn: N.G. 
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Ranga was elected to India’s National FAO Liaison Committee in 1950 after what he 
described as ‘three years of our [peasant] agitation.’ He served in this capacity until 
1957 under the chairmanship of India’s Minister of Agriculture. Yet ‘despite all my 
efforts,’ Ranga recalled, ‘our Commission could not take much initiative, due to the 
conservative attitude of the Ministry.’86 Contributions to the development of fisheries 
and livestock schemes may have held appeal to their direct stakeholders, but for 
votaries of the peasantry, the FAO’s pivot away from questions of prices and 
productivity towards the import of expertise and the export of Indian talent represented 
an unmitigated abandonment of earlier promises.  
 
6. B.R. Sen, Direct Assistance, and the Freedom From Hunger Campaign  
 
The widening cleavage between Indian developmental aims and the winnowing 
potential of the Food and Agriculture Organization was to grow starker during the 
directorship of B.R. Sen. These were the high-water days of agricultural planning and 
the transfer of expertise, and grains, in India. In the absence of hybrid seeds and the 
social and political conditions needed to grow them effectively, India’s administrators 
eagerly welcomed the agricultural expertise being made available — nearly $71 million 
dollars’ worth by the end of the decade — from the United States’ Technical 
Cooperation Mission.87 Meanwhile, short-sleeved Americans flocked to Indian villages 
in shirt-sleeves under the auspices of the Community Development Program, and 
officials of the Rockefeller and Ford Foundation scoured the length and breadth of the 
country looking for funding opportunities.88 All the while, American grains flooded 
Indian stores under the aegis of the United States’ PL480 ‘Food for Peace’ legislation.  
 
An anemic budget did little to assist the comparative prestige of the FAO, in spite of the 
unexpected election of an Indian national as the FAO’s chief. B.R. Sen, a former 
Department of Food official serving as Ambassador to Japan, narrowly edged out a 
Harvard Business School professor and former Assistant Secretary of Agriculture, the 
Philippines’ Ambassador to the United Nations, a fisheries expert from the 
Netherlands, and Spain’s Director of Commercial Policy. The election of an Asian to the 
directorship ended a long period of American administration of the FAO, though did 
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little to curb its influence: The United States was contributing, at Sen’s election, nearly a 
third of its overall finances and half of the funding designated for technical assistance 
field programs.89 Sen’s first months and years in office saw the Indian national 
attempting to reprioritize an organizational focus on Asia and, to a lesser extent, Latin 
America. His first official trip was to Dhaka, then in East Pakistan, for talks on the food 
situation there.90 Shortly thereafter, Sen declared that, as an Asian, he was uniquely 
positioned to ‘speak for millions who are striving out of poverty today in the world’s 
vast under-developed regions.’91 The deputation, shortly thereafter, of an Agricultural 
Extension Study Tour which brought together senior officers from a dozen countries to 
study the agriculture of India, Japan, and the Philippines, further underscored a shifting 
geographic commitment.92  
 
By the end of the decade, however, it was clear that effective management of the 
fledgling organization required a new start — particularly in light of the Organization’s 
own findings, via the World Food Survey, that per capita food consumption in Asia and 
Latin America had sunk to pre-World War II levels.93 Sen, endowed with a sense of 
moral determination that no doubt stemmed in part from his capable work during the 
Bengal Famine, set about seeking a different approach. The new paradigm took shape 
in a brainstorming session with the FAO’s policy planning board in the wake of a 
meeting with Dwight D. Eisenhower; in January 1959, Sen announced the inauguration 
of the Freedom From Hunger Campaign, which he hoped would ‘impel’ the world to 
take major efforts in the fight against hunger. Doubling down on the efforts to cast 
hunger as a global ethical concern, the FFHC would work ‘to attract worldwide 
attention to the problem [of hunger]; to secure the participation and cooperation of all 
concerned; to achieve a degree of enthusiasm and anticipation which would result in 
more effective national and international action; and in the process, establish a higher 
level of mutually profitable world trade to help the prosperity of both developed and 
developing countries.’94  
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The FFHC faced American resistance from the very start. Committed to the premise of 
‘trade not aid,’ and the dumping of surpluses to curry political favor, the United States 
government sought to defang and defund the Campaign. Hunger was not a moral 
problem, its representatives to the FAO suggested, but an economic one, and posed no 
obligation per se on countries with surpluses.95 As a result, Sen suggested that the FAO 
call upon non-governmental organizations to partner with agencies in developing 
countries under its aegis; companies, too, were soon welcomed into the fold.  
 
Indian reception was enthusiastic. The FFHC, Food Minister S.K. Patil gushed at the 
1959 Rome Conference, was a reminder that it was ‘equally the responsibility of the 
surplus countries to take preventative action to avoid conditions of scarcity,’ even if the 
United States, the FAO’s biggest donor, had not signed on to this claim.96 Perhaps most 
importantly from the subcontinental perspective, the FFHC posed no threat to the 
consolidation of Indian research autonomy, since it focused on person-to-person 
knowledge transfers — and left development in staple grains to national agencies and 
the foundations which were increasingly expressing interest in Indian agricultural 
development.  
 
The campaign was kicked off in India amid much fanfare at the beginning of 1961. Two 
bodies, the National Campaign Committee, and the Governing Board, were established, 
the former comprising eighty-one members presided over by the Minister for Food, 
Agriculture, Community Development and Cooperation, and the latter comprising fifty 
members headed by the Minister of State for Food and Agriculture.97 The Union 
Minister of Food and Agriculture, S.K. Patil, delivered a broadcast on All-India Radio to 
introduce the campaign. ‘The quick solution of hunger and malnutrition,’ he contended, 
‘is the key to [India’s] orderly and stable development.’ Despite the ceremonial 
leadership of Rajendra Prasad, Jawaharlal Nehru, and Sarvapelli Radhakrishnan, Patil 
contended that the Center’s engagement with it would be limited, and that it was state 
governments and nongovernmental organizations ‘who have got to import real life to 
the campaign,’ singling out Chambers of Commerce and Trade Unions as particularly 
important actors.98  
 
The development of staple crops continued to occur under the auspices of national 
institutions, but the FFHC would now serve as the principle coordinator in India for 
non-governmental organizations working broadly in the field of food production.99 The 
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FFHC in India would receive proposals from organizations on the ground, and those 
deemed technically feasible would be sent to the FAO for review. A screening 
committee at the FAO would then circulate proposals to prospective donors, before 
brokering bilateral assistance agreements and arranging for donations in cash and kind. 
By the late summer, with a grant from the Union Government of 20,000 rupees, the 
Campaign’s Delhi headquarters was printing pamphlets in multiple languages and 
posters to hang in railway stations, district councils, and schools. A mobile unit was 
deputed from the Central Information and Broadcasting Ministry to circulate campaign 
information. The first two projects that the Campaign would sponsor was the 
popularization of Japanese implements and techniques for rice growing; the second was 
to be a scheme for the manufacture and distribution of better poultry feed.100  
 
Yet as India struggled under the weight of continued staple grain shortages, the most 
significant projects undertaken with the FFHC concerned the development of high-
protein supplemental food — a sign of the FAO’s limited ingress into core 
developmental projects. A project was inaugurated in Orissa under the auspices of an 
American poultry production to encourage home poultry rearing in the name of more 
meat, fertilizer, and eggs.101 A million-dollar grant from the United States FFHC 
provided for the import of crossbreed chickens, the development of better feed, and the 
training of extension workers. The Australian FFHC partnered with the Union 
government to expand this project, providing $130,000 to airlift 10,000 day-old chicks 
from Australia, while the Indian government provided another $870,000 for buildings, 
staff, land and facilities. The program was soon expanded into Uttar Pradesh, where a 
new center would train 50 to 100 farmers and provide them with equipment, feed, 
vaccine and medicine on credit.102 By 1967, Indians were still far short of the 80 billion 
eggs needed to supply half its population with a daily egg. Yet the FFHC program had 
been credited with Indians eating double the eggs they had consumed at the time of the 
project’s inception.103  
 
Where poultry came first, milk soon followed. Oxfam, in 1962, donated $300,000 to the 
Campaign to purchase a feed mixing plant for the pioneering Kaira Milk Producers’ 
Union in Anand.104 The plant — with funding from the Campaign Committees in 
Glasgow and Clydeside, Scotland as well as the New Zealand Committee and UNICEF 
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— was inaugurated by Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri in early 1965. The local 
Freedom From Hunger Coordinator characterized the plant as a further step in ‘the 
story of a milk revolution: the story of a small group of progressive farmers blazing a 
new trail in the dairy industry.’105 (A lesser contribution to Indian dairying came in the 
milk buffalos donated to blind graduates of the Tata Agricultural and Rural Training 
Center for the Blind by students of the Convent of the Holy Ghost School in Bedford, 
England.)106  
 
Smaller projects came alongside these major investments. In the first years of the 
campaign, an anonymous French donor provided $1020 dollars to the World Seed 
Campaign, with the stipulation that it be used in the Campaign in India.107 India 
requested, under the FFHC, the import of improved ‘Great Scot’ potato seeds for 
planting in the Nilgiris.108 A joint FAO and UNICEF ‘Expanded Nutrition Program’ was 
piloted in 240 villages in Orissa, developing nutrition schemes, poultry projects, school 
gardens and fisheries with the assistance of Mahili Samitis (Women’s Clubs) and youth 
groups.109 A farm broadcasting course was held with funding from the Austrlian 
Committee and the Oxford Committee for famine relief; an FAO farm radio specialist 
was deputed to train extension officers from the Indian Department of Agriculture in 
agricultural programming, and to assist female extension officers in programming on 
gardening, poultry-rearing, and hygiene.110 The UK Save the Children Fund sponsored 
nutrition vans to travel throughout Indian cities and villages and the Heifer Project flew 
180 Yorkshire, Landrace, and Tamworth pigs to India for local breeding schemes.111 The 
Finnish FFHC Committee donated $82,000 to construct water supply points across 
cyclone-damaged areas in Maharashtra’s Ratnagiri district.112  
 
In September 1964, Canadian Prime Minister Lester Pearson announced the creation of 
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‘Mysore Week’ in Canada, designed to raise attention to and engagement with the 
Canadian-sponsored International Training Center in Food Technology at Mysore. 
Canadian Army, Navy, and Air Force Cadets sold ball-point pens with which 
Canadians were urged to ‘write off hunger,’ asking Canadian citizens to donate one 
cent per pound of body weight. ‘Share-a-loaf’ cards were distributed in groceries for 
Canadians to make donations.113 Canada Week was trumpeted in a full-page leader in 
the Financial Post, proclaiming that ‘from farm hands to business leaders, Canadians 
contributed to the $500,000 five year-project designed to help India and other southeast 
Asian countries produce badly needed food preservation experts.’ An Ontario-based 
food expert from ‘one of the world’s food-smartest nations — sprawling, sparsely-
populated, well-fed Canada’ was sent to India to oversee expansion of the Training 
Center.114 Two years later, the Center was opened, with trainees being instructed in the 
prevention of spoilage and the nutritional amelioration of processed foods.115  
 
The final years of the FFHC in India coincided with worsening agricultural returns in 
staple grains, and a full-on crisis in the form of the Bihar Famine of 1966-67. Work 
continued throughout the Famine, on a small scale: in March 1966, the French FFHC 
sent an exploratory mission to India, delivering seven hundred tons of powdered milk 
(beyond the five hundred tons already sent), alongside 25 million vitamin pills and 21 
million iron pills.116 The Campaign also set up a ‘Joint Food Development Organization’ 
which would oversee religious relief and development organizations, namely the 
National Christian Council of India and the Roman Catholic Indian Social Institute.117 
At the end of 1970 — B.R. Sen having ended his term in 1967 — the Indian FFHC had 
overseen fifteen major national projects, fifteen provincial projects, and seventy-two 
under taken by private groups. The largest single national donor to India had been the 
Netherlands, followed by Australia and the FAO itself, then Denmark’s Board of 
Cooperation with Foreign Countries and West Germany’s Central Agency.118 The 
United States was notably absent from that list, and that absence spoke to the ultimate 
toothlessness of the Campaign, and the Organization at large at this moment.  
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7. Conclusion  
 
In 1966, senior FAO administrator Cedric Day delivered a cautious assessment of the 
Organization’s work in India, which reflected the deferential stance of the day.119 ‘We 
have no program here as such,’ he contended. ‘We are here at the request of the 
Government of India to advise and to participate in the Government’s own program. 
Any work we undertake is in response to a Government demand, including UN Special 
Fund projects and Freedom From Hunger Campaign projects.’ To some degree, this 
statement spoke to the exigencies of the day, and B.R. Sen’s vision of an agency that 
would overcome limitations of funding by being agile, light, and responsible, 
facilitating partnerships rather than undertaking major schemes by itself.  
 
Yet Day appended a thought that was more revealing than he might have intended. 
India, by 1966, he believed, was awash in expertise, in everything from nutrition and 
dairy to home economics, forestry, cattle breeding and logging. But ‘as in so many fields 
of technology,’ he noted, ‘India is not so much in need of the advice of experts as in 
need of material assistance. Indian ‘know-how’ in the whole field of agriculture is both 
wide and deep and, indeed, as in the case of other technologies and sciences, FAO 
draws on Indian expertise in this field and has scores of Indian experts serving not only 
on the FAO headquarters staff but also in the field on various projects. It is not therefore 
a lack of knowledge or ability that calls for FAO experts so much as the sheer 
magnitude of the various problems confronting India.’  
 
Ultimately, it was material assistance that India required. Day was writing in 1966, at 
the very moment that India’s mounting food crisis was wedding it further to American 
imports, and ultimately, forced its agricultural and political bureaucracy to embrace the 
imperatives of high-yielding varieties and concentrated agricultural ‘packages.’120 These 
reforms tied India to a program of technological modernization without the requisite 
transformation of its political economy. If the FAO’s earliest administrators and those 
who left national postings to join the Organization once shared this vision, by the mid-
1966s, it had been abandoned entirely in favor of an institution that eschewed the goal 
of a world without hunger, and ceded space for major interventions to Western 
diplomatic and scientific power and the rising cloud of private foundations and 
institutions like the World Bank. 
 
Symbolically resonant for its birth at a moment of global scarcity, the FAO could never 
capitalize on the breathless promises that its earliest planners had offered to a hungry 
world. Stymied by Anglo-American restraint and foot-dragging, the Organization’s 
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savviest heads maneuvered carefully so that it might find a productive space in the 
pantheon of global expertise. Indian administrators and bureaucrats — from W.R. 
Akyroyd to the men and women steering FFHC projects — proceeded with equal 
agility, as a new international organization offered new opportunities for career 
advancement, the settling of policy debates on the home front, and the ability to boost 
certain developmental projects, so long as they did not intrude upon the core 
developmental priorities of a hungry state. The FAO offered space for these motions, 
and a dynamism that ebbed and flowed with the course of global geopolitics, but its 
promise of great leaps in the quest for plenty remained tragically unfulfilled.  
